Market Making - How Liquidity Providers Work
TL;DR
Market makers are traders who provide liquidity by continuously posting both buy (bid) and sell (ask) orders. They profit from the spread (difference between bid and ask) while taking on inventory risk.
- Maker = Adds liquidity (posts limit orders that rest on book)
- Taker = Removes liquidity (executes against resting orders)
- MMs earn rebates for providing liquidity, takers pay fees
- MMs must manage inventory risk - holding assets that move against them
- Exchanges need MMs for tight spreads and deep liquidity
What Does a Market Maker Actually Do?
A market maker's job is simple in concept: always be willing to buy and sell.
Without Market Maker:
Order Book:
Asks: $105 (10 units) ← Seller wants $105
Bids: $95 (10 units) ← Buyer wants $95
Spread: $10 (10%!)
You want to buy NOW? Pay $105.
You want to sell NOW? Get $95.
Terrible prices for everyone.
With Market Maker:
Order Book:
Asks: $100.05 (1000 units) ← MM willing to sell
Bids: $99.95 (1000 units) ← MM willing to buy
Spread: $0.10 (0.1%)
You want to buy NOW? Pay $100.05 (much better!)
You want to sell NOW? Get $99.95 (much better!)The market maker provides a service: immediate execution at reasonable prices. In exchange, they capture the spread.
Who Are the Major Crypto Market Makers?
The crypto market making space is dominated by a mix of TradFi veterans (firms from traditional finance) and crypto-native shops.
The Big Players
| Firm | Profile |
|---|---|
| Wintermute | ~$15B daily volume, 65+ venues, crypto-native (2017). Hybrid culture: TradFi execution speed + crypto startup agility. |
| Cumberland DRW | Subsidiary of DRW (TradFi trading giant). Institutional focus since 2014. Known for block trades, TWAP execution, and deep bank relationships. |
| Jump Crypto | Arm of Jump Trading. Quantitative HFT, ultra-low latency, research-heavy. One of the most sophisticated technical operations. |
| GSR Markets | OTC + exchange MM. Strong in token launches and derivatives. |
| DWF Labs | MM + venture investor. Provides liquidity as part of token ecosystem deals. |
| Flow Traders | European firm, ETF specialists expanding into crypto. |
| Virtu Financial | TradFi HFT giant. Handles significant retail equity flow via PFOF. Expanding in crypto. |
TradFi vs Crypto-Native
| Aspect | TradFi Firms (Jump, DRW, Virtu) | Crypto-Native (Wintermute, GSR) |
|---|---|---|
| Experience | Decades in equities/futures | Built for crypto from day 1 |
| Infrastructure | Massive, battle-tested | Purpose-built for 24/7 markets |
| Regulatory | Deep compliance expertise | More agile, less legacy process |
| DeFi | Slower adoption | Native integration |
| Culture | Traditional finance | Startup / crypto community |
Both types compete on the same exchanges, often in the same order books.
How Market Makers Profit
The Spread
The spread is the difference between the best bid and best ask. Market makers profit by:
- Buying at the bid price
- Selling at the ask price
- Pocketing the difference
MM posts:
BID: Buy 100 BTC @ $99,950
ASK: Sell 100 BTC @ $100,050
Scenario: Both sides fill
- Bought 100 BTC for $9,995,000
- Sold 100 BTC for $10,005,000
- Profit: $10,000 (the spread × quantity)
Spread capture = (Ask - Bid) × Quantity filled on both sidesThe Reality: It's Not That Simple
In practice, both sides rarely fill equally. The MM ends up with inventory:
MM posts:
BID: Buy 100 @ $99,950
ASK: Sell 100 @ $100,050
What actually happens:
Hour 1: 80 people buy from MM (MM sells 80)
Hour 2: 20 people sell to MM (MM buys 20)
Net: MM is now SHORT 60 BTC
If price goes UP: MM loses money on short position
If price goes DOWN: MM makes money on short position + spreadThis is inventory risk - the core challenge of market making.
Maker vs Taker: The Fee Model
Why Exchanges Incentivize Makers
Exchanges want liquidity. More liquidity = tighter spreads = better experience for everyone. So they:
- Reward makers (rebates) - "Thanks for adding liquidity"
- Charge takers (fees) - "You're consuming liquidity"
Typical Fee Structure:
| Role | Action | Fee |
|-------|----------------------------|------------|
| Maker | Post limit order on book | -2 bps (rebate) |
| Taker | Execute against resting | +5 bps (fee) |
bps = basis points (1 bps = 0.01%)
Example:
You BUY 1 BTC @ $100,000 as TAKER
Fee: $100,000 × 0.0005 = $50
MM SOLD 1 BTC @ $100,000 as MAKER
Rebate: $100,000 × 0.0002 = $20
Exchange keeps: $50 - $20 = $30How to Be a Maker vs Taker
Order Book: Best ask $100.10, Best bid $100.00
MAKER orders (add liquidity):
Limit BUY @ $99.90 → Goes on book (below best ask)
Limit SELL @ $100.20 → Goes on book (above best bid)
TAKER orders (remove liquidity):
Limit BUY @ $100.20 → Executes immediately (crosses spread)
Limit SELL @ $99.90 → Executes immediately (crosses spread)
Market BUY/SELL → Always taker
Post-Only modifier:
Forces order to be maker-only
Rejected if it would cross the spreadFee Tiers and Volume Rebates
Exchanges reward high-volume traders and market makers with better rates:
Volume-Based Fee Tiers
| Tier | 30-Day Volume | Maker Fee | Taker Fee |
|------|----------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1 | < $1M | 2 bps | 5 bps |
| 2 | $1M - $10M | 1.5 bps | 4 bps |
| 3 | $10M - $50M | 1 bps | 3 bps |
| 4 | $50M - $100M | 0 bps | 2.5 bps |
| 5 | > $100M | -1 bps | 2 bps |
At Tier 5: Makers get PAID to provide liquidityMarket Share Rebates
Beyond volume, some exchanges reward market share - what percentage of all maker volume you provide:
| Market Share | Additional Rebate |
|--------------|-------------------|
| > 1% | +0.5 bps |
| > 5% | +1.0 bps |
| > 10% | +1.5 bps |
If you're 10% of all maker volume:
Base maker fee: 0 bps
Market share rebate: +1.5 bps
Net: You receive 1.5 bps on every fillThis incentivizes MMs to provide consistent, deep liquidity.
Exchange-Market Maker Relationships
Exchanges and market makers have a symbiotic relationship. Understanding this deal helps explain why liquidity exists.
The Symbiotic Deal
What Exchange Offers MM: What MM Provides Exchange:
├─ Fee rebates (negative fees) ├─ Tight spreads (better UX)
├─ Designated MM programs ├─ Deep liquidity (less slippage)
├─ Colocation / low-latency access ├─ 24/7 continuous quoting
├─ Early listing access ├─ Backstop during liquidations
├─ Higher API rate limits ├─ Volume (attracts more traders)
└─ Revenue sharing deals └─ Market stabilityWhy this works: Exchange makes money on taker fees. More liquidity → tighter spreads → more takers → more revenue. Paying MMs to provide liquidity is profitable for the exchange.
Designated Market Maker (DMM) Programs
Many exchanges have formal DMM programs with specific obligations:
| Requirement | Typical Value | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|
| Max spread | 10-50 bps from mid | Ensures tight quotes |
| Min size | $50K-$500K notional per side | Ensures depth |
| Uptime | 90%+ of market hours | Ensures reliability |
| Markets covered | Multiple symbols | Ensures breadth |
In return, DMMs receive:
- Negative maker fees (get paid to trade)
- Cash rebates based on performance
- Direct relationship with exchange
- Priority support and API access
Example (BitMEX DMM Program):
- Regular tier: Basic rebates for meeting quote requirements
- Senior tier: Larger MMs get better rebates + dedicated support
- Daily cash payments calculated from quoting metrics
- 90%+ uptime requirement across 24-hour markets
Why Exchanges Want Multiple MMs
Having several competing MMs is better than one:
Single MM: Multiple MMs:
├─ Can widen spreads ├─ Competition keeps spreads tight
├─ Single point of failure ├─ Redundancy if one goes down
├─ Price manipulation risk ├─ Better price discovery
└─ Dependency └─ Negotiating leverage for exchangeMost liquid markets have 5-20+ active market makers competing.
The MM's Perspective
MMs evaluate exchanges on:
- Volume - More trades = more spread capture opportunity
- Fee structure - Better rebates = higher margins
- Latency - Can they colocate? API speed?
- Counterparty quality - Is the flow toxic or retail?
- Reliability - Does the exchange go down? Matching engine bugs?
- Regulatory - Legal risk of operating on this exchange?
A top-tier MM like Wintermute might be active on 50+ venues, allocating capital based on these factors.
Market Maker Strategies
1. Simple Spread Capture
Post symmetric orders around mid-price:
Mid price: $100.00
MM posts:
BID: $99.95 (5 cents below mid)
ASK: $100.05 (5 cents above mid)
Spread: 10 cents
If both fill: 10 cents profit per unit2. Skewed Quotes (Inventory Management)
Adjust prices based on current inventory:
MM is LONG 50 BTC (wants to sell)
Instead of symmetric:
BID: $99.95, ASK: $100.05
Skew towards selling:
BID: $99.90, ASK: $100.02
- Less aggressive bid (less likely to buy more)
- More aggressive ask (more likely to sell)
- Reduces inventory over time3. Volatility-Based Spreads
Widen spreads when risk is high:
Normal conditions:
Spread: 5 cents
High volatility / news event:
Spread: 50 cents
Why? During volatility:
- Prices move fast
- MM can get "picked off" by informed traders
- Wider spread compensates for higher risk4. Cross-Exchange Arbitrage
Use prices from other venues to set quotes:
Binance BTC: $100,000
Coinbase BTC: $100,050
Backpack BTC: ???
MM on Backpack:
- Sees Binance/Coinbase prices
- Quotes $100,020 bid / $100,030 ask
- If someone buys at $100,030, MM hedges by buying on Binance at $100,000
- Locks in $30 profit regardless of where price goesThe Risks of Market Making
1. Inventory Risk
The biggest risk. You accumulate positions that move against you:
MM starts flat (no position)
Day 1: Market rallies, everyone buys
- MM sells 100 BTC at various prices
- MM is now SHORT 100 BTC
Day 2: Market continues up 5%
- MM's short position loses 5% = $500,000 loss
- Spread captured: maybe $10,000
Net: -$490,000
The spread profit is tiny compared to directional risk.2. Adverse Selection
Getting "picked off" by informed traders:
MM is quoting BTC:
BID: $99,950
ASK: $100,050
Breaking news: Major company announces BTC purchase
Price should be $105,000
Informed trader:
- Sees news before MM can react
- Buys from MM at $100,050
- MM sold at $100,050, now worth $105,000
- MM loses $4,950 per BTC
This is why MMs widen spreads during news events.3. Technical Risk
System failures are catastrophic:
MM system goes down:
- Orders still resting on book
- Price moves 10%
- Orders get filled at terrible prices
- By the time system recovers: massive losses
MMs need:
- Redundant systems
- Kill switches
- Automatic order cancellation on disconnect4. Funding Rate Risk (Perpetuals)
In perpetual futures, holding inventory costs money:
MM is SHORT 100 BTC (inventory from selling to buyers)
Funding rate: +0.01% every 8 hours (longs pay shorts)
Good: MM receives funding while short
But if funding flips negative:
MM PAYS funding while short
Holding inventory becomes expensiveBackstop Liquidity Providers
Some exchanges have designated market makers who agree to provide liquidity in extreme conditions (liquidations). Backpack calls these Backstop Liquidity Providers.
How Backstop Works
Normal liquidation:
Account MF drops below MMF
→ Engine places IOC orders on the book
→ Regular MMs (and anyone) can fill them
Backstop liquidation (when book is thin):
Account MF drops further (below mf_auto_close)
→ Engine forces designated backstop MMs to take the position
→ Guaranteed fill, but at a price favorable to MMBackstop MM Configuration
BackstopLiquidityMarketMaker {
account_id: ...,
symbol: "SOL_USDC_PERP",
capacity_notional: $500,000, // Current available capacity
max_capacity_notional: $1,000,000, // Maximum capacity
refresh_rate_notional_hour: $100,000, // Replenishes over time
refresh_rate_notional_minute: $10,000,
}Key concepts:
- Capacity - How much notional the MM can absorb right now
- Refresh rate - Capacity replenishes over time (can't be exhausted instantly)
- Max capacity - Upper limit on exposure
Why MMs Agree to Backstop
- Favorable pricing - Backstop fills happen at a discount (MM gets a good entry)
- Rebates - Additional compensation for backstop role
- Relationship - Access to other exchange benefits
- Market stability - A functioning market benefits everyone
Market Making Economics
Revenue Sources
1. Spread capture
$0.10 spread × 1000 BTC/day = $100/day
2. Maker rebates
$100M volume × 1 bps = $10,000/day
3. Funding arbitrage (perps)
Collect funding on inventory when favorable
4. Cross-exchange arb
Price discrepancies between venuesCost Sources
1. Inventory losses
Directional moves against position
2. Adverse selection
Getting picked off by informed traders
3. Infrastructure
Servers, connectivity, monitoring
4. Capital cost
Money tied up in positions and collateral
5. Hedging costs
Fees on other exchanges when hedgingThe Math
Successful MM:
Daily volume: $100M
Spread: 2 bps average capture
Gross spread revenue: $20,000
Maker rebate: 1 bps
Rebate revenue: $10,000
Inventory P&L: -$5,000 (managed well)
Infrastructure: -$2,000
Net profit: $23,000/day
Unsuccessful MM:
Same volume and spread...
But inventory P&L: -$50,000 (got caught in a move)
Net profit: -$27,000/day
The difference is risk management.How MMs Interact with the Exchange
Order Flow
1. MM connects via WebSocket (low latency)
2. Subscribes to order book updates
3. Calculates fair price using:
- Other exchange prices
- Recent trades
- Order book imbalance
4. Posts bid/ask orders
5. Monitors fills
6. Adjusts quotes based on:
- Inventory changes
- Price movements
- Volatility changes
7. Repeat continuously (milliseconds)Key API Features MMs Need
- Fast order placement/cancellation
- Bulk order operations (post many orders at once)
- Post-only order type (guarantee maker)
- Self-trade prevention (don't match own orders)
- WebSocket for real-time updates
- Low-latency connectivity
- Kill switch / cancel-all endpointColocation
Professional MMs often colocate (place servers physically close to exchange):
Retail trader:
Home → ISP → Internet → Exchange
Latency: 50-200ms
Colocated MM:
Server → Same datacenter → Exchange
Latency: <1ms
Why it matters:
- First to react to price changes
- First to cancel stale quotes
- Less adverse selectionCommon MM Terminology
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Spread | Difference between best bid and ask |
| Mid | (Best bid + Best ask) / 2 |
| Edge | Expected profit per trade |
| Inventory | Net position from MM activity |
| Skew | Adjusting quotes based on inventory |
| Picked off | Filled by informed trader at bad price |
| Stale quote | Order at outdated price |
| Toxicity | How informed/adverse the order flow is |
| Fill rate | What % of posted orders get filled |
| Queue position | Where your order sits at a price level |
Summary
Market making is a service business:
- Service provided: Immediate liquidity at tight spreads
- Compensation: Spread capture + maker rebates
- Risk taken: Inventory/directional risk + adverse selection
- Skill required: Managing inventory, reacting fast, surviving adverse selection
It's not free money. MMs provide real value (liquidity) and take real risk (inventory). The successful ones manage risk better than the spread they capture.
MM Equation:
Profit = Spread Revenue + Rebates - Inventory Losses - Adverse Selection - Costs
If Spread + Rebates > Losses + Costs → Profitable
If Losses > Spread + Rebates → BankruptThe exchange wants MMs because tight spreads attract traders. MMs want the exchange because volume means more spread capture. It's symbiotic - when it works.